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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE ACTION- PARTICIPATION BY STATE
RACING OFFICIALS IN RACETRACK'S DECISION TO TERMINATE PRIVATE
STALL AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES STATE ACTION.
Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc. (1979)
Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc. (Mountain Laurel) 1 terminated its private
"stall agreement" 2 with William Fitzgerald, a state-licensed harness racing
driver and trainer, 3 and, as a practical consequence, evicted Fitzgerald from
the Mountain Laurel racetrack.4 Before expelling Fitzgerald for inconsistent
driving,5 the racetrack management met with two state racing officials-the
racing secretary and the presiding racing judge-who were privately
employed by the racetrack but licensed by the Pennsylvania State Harness
Racing Commission (Racing Commission) to enforce Racing Commission
rules.6 These officials confirmed the racetrack's suspicions that Fitzgerald
had engaged in inconsistent driving. 7 Pursuant to the management's deci-
1. Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 263 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 607
F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1979). Mountain Laurel is a private Pennsylvania corporation leasing and
operating the privately owned Meadows Race Track for a profit. 607 F.2d at 592. As a pre-
requisite to the operation of such an enterprise, Mountain Laurel was licensed by the Pennsyl-
vania State Harness Racing Commssion to conduct harness racing in the Commonwealth. Id.
See note 14 infra.
2. The "stall agreement" between Mountain Laurel and the individual trainers and drivers
extended free stall space at the track to trainers and drivers as long as the horses involved were
run in races and managed according to the terms of the contract. 607 F.2d at 592. In the
agreement, Mountain Laurel reserved the unrestricted right to revoke the agreement upon
giving the owner or trainer 72 hours notice to vacate the premises. Id. Mountain Laurel also
reserved the right to reject any entry and to refuse admittance to, or eject from the track,
individuals whom it considered to be undesirable. Id. at 592-93. The approval of the Pennsyl-
vania State Harness Racing Commission was required before the racetrack was permitted to use
the stall agreement. Id. at 592.
3. Id. at 593. In Pennsylvania, all persons directly involved in harness racing must be state
licensed. Id. at 592. Drivers, trainers, grooms and owners of horses are licensed by the
Pennsylvania State Harness Racing Commission before they may engage in harness racing. Id.
4. Id. at 601.
5. "Inconsistent driving" refers to the driver's racing in a manner inconsistent with an
established pattern of prior performances and implies an improper motive on the part of the
driver. Id. at 604 n.1 (Adams, J., dissenting). As the Fitzgerald court stated: "The gist of the
offense is that the driver is not giving the best performance possible, which detracts from the
quality of the race." Id. at 593.
Judge Adams' dissent, however, characterized the underlying cause of the revocation of the
stall agreement as Fitzgerald's driving horses that had been racing inconsistently. Id. at 604
(Adams, J., dissenting). In other words, the charge referred "only to the performance of the
horses," not "improper motive or lackadaisical behavior on the part of the driver." Id. at 604
n.1 (Adams, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
6. Id. at 592-93. As explained by the court, "[t]he presiding judge is charged by the Racing
Commission with the task of enforcing the rules and regulations of the Commission, supervising
all other licensed race officials, and with rendering daily records to the Commission of the
activities and conduct of the race meetings." Id. at 592. The racing secretary "performs certain
administrative duties, specifically fixed by the Racing Commission, including the establishing of
standards for horses." Id. (citation omitted).
7. Id. at 592.
(995)
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sion, and while in the presence of the racing judge, the racing secretary
notified Fitzgerald of his expulsion.8
Fitzgerald brought an action under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 (section 1983)9 in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania' 0 seeking to enjoin the racetrack operators from
precluding him from racing at the track." The plaintiff contended that, in
evicting him without a hearing, the defendants' 2 had denied him due pro-
cess of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment.1 3 The district court,
finding a close nexus between Mountain Laurel's expulsion of Fitzgerald and
the state's extensive regulation of harness racing, 14 and considering the in-
volvement of state officials in this particular decision to evict, decided that
state action" was involved 15 and granted the plaintiffs motion for a pre-
8. Id. at 593.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat.
13). Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any .. .regulation .. .of any State . subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States .. . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
id.
The jurisdictional counterpart to § 1983 is § 1343(3) of the Judicial Code. 28 U.S.C. §
1343(3) (1976). Section 1343(3) provides in pertinent part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law
to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution
of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
id.
10. 464 F. Supp. at 263.
11. Id. at 264. The Third Circuit noted on appeal that the district court had treated the
complaint as a request for a temporary restraining order under rule 65(b) and a preliminary
injunction under rule 65(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 607 F.2d at 593. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 65(a)-(b). The plaintiffs petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order was
denied. 464 F. Supp. at 264.
12. The defendants in this suit were Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc.; Kenneth Marshall, the
track racing secretary; and John Knight, the track presiding judge. 607 F.2d at 593.
13. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent
part: "No state shall ...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." Id.
14. 464 F. Supp. at 267. In Pennsylvania, as in most states, harness racing is a heavily
regulated activity. 607 F.2d at 592. Private racing associations engaged in pari-mutuel betting are
required to obtain licenses from the state before commencing operations. Id. Oflicers and stock-
holders of such associations are subject to the approval of the Racing Commission. Id. In
addition, the state collects revenues by taking a percentage of the track's betting income, while
at the same time providing funds for the track's "breakage"-that is, splitting the difference
between the computer set odds and the actual mathematical payoff to the bettors at the track.
Id. at 592 & n.2. Moreover, the state provides funds for the Pennsylvania Sire Stakes races held
at various tracks. Id.
15. 464 F. Supp. at 267. Because the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution restricts
only state governments, a claim alleging deprivation of rights guaranteed by these provisions
must demonstrate "state action." See Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional
[Vol. 25: p. 995
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liminary injunction.16 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed, 1 7 holding that the participation of state officials, with
delegated authority to enforce state laws, in a private decision to terminate a
contractual agreement for violation of a State Racing Commission rule consti-
tutes state action for purposes of section 1983.18 Fitzgerald v. Mountain
Laurel Racing, Inc., 607 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1979).
In the Civil Rights Cases of 1883,19 the United States Supreme Court
recognized the dichotomy between state action subject to the restrictions of
the fourteenth amendment and private action which falls outside the realm
of constitutional scrutiny.20 This distinction was advanced primarily to pro-
mote the private structuring of relationships and to prevent arbitrary inter-
ference by state governments. 2 ' Because there is no precise formula with
which to make the determination, the question of whether particular state
Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656 (1974). The Third Circuit has stated
that "[t]he requirement that actions challenged under Section 1983 be taken 'under color of'
state law has been treated as the equivalent of the element of 'state action' essential under the
fourteenth amendment." Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948, 955 n.34 (3d Cir.
1977) (en banc) (citations omitted). For the pertinent text of § 1983, see note 9 supra.
16. 464 F. Supp. at 269. The district court enjoined Mountain Laurel from denying
Fitzgerald "the right to stall horses, drive horses, train horses, and make other use of the
facilities." 607 F.2d at 593. The district court also denied Mountain Laurel's motion to invoke
disciplinary procedures under the rules and regulations of the Racing Commission which would
have afforded Fitzgerald a hearing in an attempt to correct the due process violation. Id.
After the grant of the preliminary injunction, Fitzgerald continued to train and race horses
until the close of the 1978 racing season, at which time he voluntarily left the track. Id. at 594.
Nevertheless, the controversy was not considered moot because the preliminary injunction was
not limited to the 1978 season and Fitzgerald could demand that Mountain Laurel permit him
to train and race horses in the future. Id.
17. 607 F.2d at 604. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Adams and Rosenn, and Judge
Lacey of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.
Judge Rosenn wrote the majority opinion and Judge Adams filed a dissenting opinion.
18. The court also held that Fitzgerald "met the essential requirements for issuance of a
preliminary injunction." Id. at 604. See note 62 infra.
19. 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (in the absence of state action, Congress has no power under the
fourteenth amendment to enact legislation guaranteeing the right to the enjoyment of public
accommodations regardless of race).
20. Id. at 11. This dichotomy has been reaffirmed in subsequent Supreme Court cases. See,
e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1971); Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13
(1948). As explained by Chief Justice Vinson in Shelley v. Kraemer,
[s]ince the decision of this court in the Civil Rights Cases . . . the principle has become
firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by ... the Four-
teenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That
Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful.
334 U.S. at 13 (citation and footnote omitted).
21. Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on
the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 1003, 1016 (1973). Other underlying reasons
for the state action doctrine include the promotion of federalism and the insurance of separation
of powers. Id. at 1014-17.
9971979-1980]
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involvement 22 is so significant 23 as to constitute state action must be
answered on a case-by-case basis "by sifting facts and weighing cir-
cumstances." 
24
The Supreme Court has promulgated two different tests2 5 in order to
determine the presence of state action-the "symbiotic relationship" test
2 6
and the "close nexus" test.27 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
2 8
the Court found that the state's "symbiotic relationship" 29 with a privately
owned restaurant located within an off-street automobile parking building
owned and operated by a state agency"0 supported a finding of discrimina-
tory state action in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 3 1 Describing the state as a "joint participant in the challenged
activity," 32 the Court noted the "incidental variety of mutual benefits" con-
22. State action may be found not only where there is state involvement, but also where
private parties perform a "public function"-i.e., functions which are "so clearly governmental
in nature that the state cannot be permitted to escape responsibility by allowing them to be
managed by a supposedly private agency." New York City Jaycees v. United States Jaycees, 512
F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1975), quoting Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1968). So, too,
the enforcement of private agreements by government officials or institutions, such as the en-
forcement of a restrictive covenant, has been found to constitute state action. Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See Note, supra note 15, at 677-80.
23. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972). In Moose Lodge, the
Court stated: "Our holdings indicate that where the impetus for the discrimination is private,
the State must have "significantly involved itself with invidious discriminations' . . . in order for
the discriminatory action to fall within the ambit of the constitutional prohibition." Id. at 173,
quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967) (emphasis added).
24. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). In Burton, the Court
explained: "Owing to the very 'largeness' of government, a multitude of relationships might
appear to some to fall within the [Fourteenth] Amendment's embrace, but that, it must be
remembered, can be determined only in the framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances
present." Id. at 725-26. See also Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conf., 516 F.2d 1328, 1332 (3d
Cir. 1975) (baseball conference operated once a year by a nonprofit corporation on public play-
ing fields and using public school facilities did not involve state action). For a discussion of
Burton, see notes 28-35 and accompanying text infra.
25. Although the Supreme Court has made no distinction between the "symbiotic relation-
ship" test and the "close nexus" test, the Third Circuit has differentiated the two analyses. See
Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948, 956-58 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc); notes 48-50
and accompanying text infra.
26. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). A "symbiotic relationship" is
one in which benefits accrue both to the state and to the private individual. Note, State Action:
The Significant State Involvement Doctrine After Moose Lodge and Jackson, 14 IDAHO L. REV.
647, 670 (1978). To constitute state action, the benefits to the state must be significant. Id.
27. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). For a discussion of Jackson
and the "close nexus" test, see notes 42-47 and accompanying text infra.
28. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
29. Id. at 725.
30. Id. at 716. The state agency, the Wilmington Parking Authority, was created to provide
adequate parking facilities for the convenience of the public in order to relieve the parking crisis
in that area. Id. at 717. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, §§ 501-15 (1974).
31. 365 U.S. at 717. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides, in
part, that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
32. 365 U.S. at 725. The Court held that
[t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the res-
taurant] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which,
on that account, cannot be considered to have been so "purely private" as to fall without
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
[Vol. 25: p. 995
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ferred on both the restaurant and the state.3 3 In particular, not only did the
restaurant benefit from being located in a publicly owned and maintained
building,34 but also the state benefited financially from the lease payments
and the increased demand for the public parking facility by the restaurant's
patrons. 35
In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,36 however, the Court specified that
the state's involvement must, in some way, "foster or encourage" the chal-
lenged activity or establish "in any realistic sense" a joint business relation-
ship. 37  Despite extensive regulation by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board, including the grant of a liquor license, 38 the Moose Lodge Court
declined to find a symbiotic relationship between the state and a private
social club operating in a private building. 39 Further limiting the symbiotic
relationship test, the Fifth Circuit, in Fulton v. Hecht, 40 found that, because
the state's regulation of dog racing was intended to protect the public rather
than to make the state a "partner" in private dog racing club endeavors,
there was no symbiotic relationship between the state and such a private
club.
41
The "close nexus" test was first formulated in Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 42 in which the Supreme Court considered "whether there is a
sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the
regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that
33. Id. at 724. See notes 34-35 and accompanying text infra.
34. 365 U.S. at 724. The state provided all upkeep and necessary repairs to the building. Id.
In addition, the restaurant was able to offer convenient parking, thereby enhancing its customer
appeal. Id.
35. Id.
36. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
37. Id. at 176-77.
38. Id. at 176. The state Liquor Contol Board (Board) required applicants to make necessary
physical alterations to their premises, to file a list of the names and addresses of its members
and employees, and to keep extensive financial records. Id. Furthermore, the licensed premises
were subject to unannounced inspections by the Board at any time when patrons, guests, or
members were present. Id.
The Court noted that, in granting the license, the state did not confer upon Moose Lodge a
monopoly in the dispensing of liquor. Id. Even so, mere monopoly status is not determinative
in a state action inquiry. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352
(1974); Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952).
39. 407 U.S. at 176-77. The Court did find, however, that the plaintiff was entitled to a
decree enjoining the enforcement of a state regulation which required compliance by Moose
Lodge with certain provisions of the club's constitution and by-laws which contained racially
discriminatory provisions. Id. at 179.
40. 545 F.2d 540 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 984 (1977). In Fulton, suit was brought
under § 1983 by a dog racer seeking to enjoin a private dog racing club's refusal to renew a
booking contract. 545 F.2d at 541.
41. 545 F.2d at 542. In addition to the regulations, the state's involvement included the
sharing of dog racing revenues and the auditing of the racetrack's books. Id. Distinguishing
Burton, the Fifth Circuit further supported its finding of no symbiotic relationship by observing
that the club did not lease public property. Id. at 542-43.
42. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). The Jackson case was heard by the United States Supreme Court
on appeal from the Third Circuit. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 483 F.2d 754 (3d
Cir. 1973), affd, 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
1979-1980] 999
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of the State itself."4 The unilateral termination, without a hearing, of a
customer's electric service by a privately owned utility company after the
customer failed to pay her bills" was found not to constitute state action in
spite of extensive state regulation of public utilities 45 and in spite of the fact
that the termination procedure was contained in a tariff which had been
approved by the State Public Utility Commission (PUC).46 Mere approval of
the termination procedure by the PUC was not enough to constitute state
action, the Court held, because "the commission ha[d] not put its own
weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it." 
47
Although Jackson made no distinction between the close nexus test and
the symbiotic relationship test articulated in Burton, 48 the Third Circuit, in
Braden v. University of Pittsburgh,49 recognized the tests to be separate and
distinct and held that state action would be present if either test is satisfied
under the facts of the particular case.
50
After setting forth this historical perspective, the Fitzgerald court con-
cluded that extensive regulation by the Racing Commission was not enough,
in and of itself, to establish state action under the Burton symbiotic relation-
ship test. 51 Following the lead of Moose Lodge, the majority found that the
state was neither a partner in the racetrack's endeavors, nor a joint ven-
turer.52 The court added that financial benefits to the state do not automati-
cally convert private acts into state action. 53 Furthermore, the court noted
that, unlike the restaurant in Burton, Mountain Laurel was not a lessee of
public property.
54
Turning to "the nature and extent of the State's involvement in the
expulsion of Fitzgerald under the stall agreement,' 55 the court concluded
43. 419 U.S. at 351.
44. Id. at 346.
45. Id. at 350.
46. Id. at 354. The Jackson Court noted that it was unclear whether the utility company
was required to file the termination procedure as part of its tariff and whether the PUC had the
power to disapprove it. Id. at 355.
47. Id. at 357.
48. For a discussion of Burton and the close nexus test, see notes 28-35 and accompanying
text supra.
49. 552 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc). In Braden, a sex discrimination case, the Third
Circuit held that state action was present because 1) a specific statute authorized the university
to act as an instrumentality of the state; 2) the university received substantial state funding; and
3) one-third of the university's board of trustees was made up of state officials or state-appointed
individuals. Id. at 958-61.
50. 552 F.2d at 958. In determining whether state action is present, Judge Friendly of the
Second Circuit has suggested a three-part analysis--i.e., courts must consider 1) the degree of
government involvement; 2) the offensiveness of the conduct complained of; and 3) the value of
preserving a private sector free from government influence. Wahba v. New York Univ., 492
F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974).
51. 607 F.2d at 596. For a discussion of the Burton symbiotic relationship test, see note 26
supra; notes 28-35 and accompanying text supra. The dissent agreed that there was no symbi-
otic relationship. 607 F.2d at 605 (Adams, J., dissenting).
52. 607 F.2d at 596. See notes 36-41 and accompanying text supra.
53. 607 F.2d at 596.
54. Id. See notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra.
55. 607 F.2d at 597.
1000 [Vol.- 25: p. 995
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that, by personally and actively participating in their official capacities in
the decision to expel Fitzgerald, the state racing officials "put their weight"
behind the summary expulsion, 56 thereby establishing state action under the
Jackson close nexus approach. 5 7 The Third Circuit found that since
Fitzgerald's expulsion was apparently contingent upon confirmation by the
state racing officials of the allegations of inconsistent driving, a critical factor
in the decision was the action of the racing officials "acting pursuant to their
delegated authority from the State." 58  The court reconciled the Jackson
court's failure to find a close nexus by arguing that the PUC's mere approval
of a general termination procedure in Jackson did not constitute active par-
ticipation in the termination of the particular plaintiff's electrical service. 59
Similarly, the majority distinguished Fulton, noting that the state in that
case neither regulated booking contracts nor participated directly or indi-
rectly in the dog racing club's decision not to renew the dog racer's con-
tract.60 In rejecting Mountain Laurel's contention that the eviction for in-
consistent driving was a valid exercise of its private property rights, 6 1 the
court observed that "whatever private rights were exerted were specifically
linked to the enforcement of Racing Commission Rules." 
6 2
56. Id. at 599. The majority framed the key issue as "whether the State participated in the
challenged conduct itself by 'putting its weight' behind the challenged activity." Id. at 597. For
a critical discussion of the majority's analysis, see notes 75-79 and accompanying text infra.
57. 607 F.2d at 599. The court considered whether there was "a sufficiently close nexus
between the State's participation in harness racing and Mountain Laurel's act of expelling [the
plaintiff] so that Mountain Laurel's act 'may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.' " Id. at
597, quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 351. For a discussion of Jackson
and the "close nexus" test, see notes 42-50 and accompanying text supra.
58. 607 F.2d at 598.
59. Id. at 599. See notes 44-47 and accompanying text supra. In contrast, according to the
Fitzgerald court, it was the official opinion of the racing officials which "precipitated"
Fitzgerald's expulsion. 607 F.2d at 599.
60. 607 F.2d at 599. See notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra. The Third Circuit ob-
served that, not only was the stall agreement in Fitzgerald state-approved, but also the state
officials had participated in the management's decision to expel Fitzgerald. 607 F.2d at 599. The
court stated: "We emphasize that it is the participation in the challenged activity which is the
critical factor in establishing state action, and not the mere state approval of the stall agree-
ment." Id. at 599 n.13.
61. 607 F.2d at 597. Under the terms of the stall agreement, Mountain Laurel, as lessor,
reserved the right to expel Fitzgerald "for any reason." Id.
62. Id. at 598. The Third Circuit then affirmed the district court's findings that the four
requirements for a preliminary injunction had been satisfied since 1) plaintiff Fitzgerald would
suffer irreparable harm to his business and reputation if relief were not granted; 2) defendant
Mountain Laurel would not be gravely harmed if Fitzgerald were allowed to continue racing
activities at the track; 3) the public would not be injured if relief were granted; and 4) the
plaintiff's "liberty" interest in his employment reputation made it likely that he would prevail
on the merits of his claim of denial of due process under the fourteenth amendment. See id. at
600-01, 604.
In finding that damage to employment reputation constituted a valid liberty interest be-
cause of the consequent deprivation of the opportunity to earn a livelihood, the Third Circuit
broadly construed the Supreme Court's definition of liberty. Id. at 602 & n.19. See Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) ("reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests
such as employment" is not "liberty" for purposes of invoking procedural due process); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-75 (1972) (failure to renew employment contract, absent
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In his dissenting opinion, Judge Adams found fault with the majority's
application of the close nexus test, 63 concluding that Mountain Laurel,
alone, had exercised its right under the terms of the stall agreement to ter-
minate Fitzgerald's privileges, and inferring that management's "consulta-
tion" with the racing officials before making that decision was not sufficient
to transform this otherwise private act into state action. 64 Emphasizing that
the racing officials lacked any power to terminate stall privileges, Judge
Adams took the view that the racing secretary merely acted "as a messenger
for his employer, the racetrack," in communicating the track's decision to
Fitzgerald. 65 Judge Adams feared that the majority's opinion might discour-
age management of extensively regulated businesses, such as commercial
banking or casino gambling, from confirming its suspicions through govern-
ment officials before discharging an employee for misconduct 66 in order to
avoid findings of state action and the resulting burden of required due proc-
ess hearings.
6 7
It is submitted that the Third Circuit correctly concluded that the
state's connections with Mountain Laurel did not rise to the level of a "sym-
biotic relationship." 68 In contrast to the restaurant in Burton,69 Mountain
63. 607 F.2d at 605-06 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams specifically criticized the
majority's holding that "the presiding racing judge and racing secretary, acting in their official
capacities, participated in the decision to expel Fitzgerald." Id. at 606 (Adams, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original). Judge Adams also expressed concern that the court's holding was contrary
to recent cases indicating the Supreme Court's refusal to define state action liberally in pro-
cedural due process cases and evidencing a reluctance on the part of the Court to impose
constitutional limitations on the manner in which private parties choose to transact business. Id.
at 606 & n.5 (Adams, J., dissenting), citing Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978)
(warehouseman's proposed sale of goods entrusted to him for storage, as permitted by New York
Uniform Commercial Code § 7-210, did not constitute state action); Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
64. 607 F.2d at 606 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams noted that Mountain Laurel pur-
sued the only logical and prudent course available when it sought to confirm its suspicions by
meeting with the racing officials, whose duty it was to monitor racing behavior. Id. Further,
Judge Adams found the record "totally barren" of any suggestion that the racing officials told
Mountain Laurel's management to terminate Fitzgerald's stall privileges or even advised them
to do so. Id.
65. Id. at 607 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams observed that the secretary lacked the
authority to terminate the stall agreement and to discipline Fitzgerald for "driving inconsistent
horses." Id.
66. Id. The majority attempted to allay the dissent's apprehension by pointing out that the
judge and racing secretary did more than just meet with management to confirm their
suspicions-they officially participated in the decision to expel. Id. at 600'& n.15. On the other
hand, in the dissent's hypotheticals, no official actually participated with management in the
decision to discharge-the investigators only reported their findings. Id.
67. Id. at 608 (Adams, J., dissenting). Alternatively, Judge Adams doubted that stigma to
reputation and the consequent loss of future employment possibilities give rise to a cognizable
liberty interest under the pertinent Supreme Court cases. Id. at 609 (Adams, J., dissenting),
citing Bishop v, Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Furthermore, Judge Adams concluded that the plaintiff
had failed to demonstrate 1) irreparable harm to himself if the injunction were not granted; 2)
that, on balance, the plaintiff would suffer greater injury from denial of the injunction than the
defendant or the public would suffer if relief were granted; and 3) that the plaintiff was reasona-
bly likely to succeed on the merits of his claim. See 607 F.2d at 610 (Adams, J., dissenting).
68. See notes 28-35 and accompanying text supra.
69. For a discussion of Burton, see notes 28-35 and accompanying text supra.
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Laurel operated on private property. 70 Although the state derived substan-
tial revenues from the racetrack, 71 the court correctly recognized that finan-
cial benefits accruing to the state do not automatically convert private acts
into state action. 72 Furthermore, the Third Circuit's ruling that extensive
state regulation was insufficient to establish a symbiotic relationship appears
to be consistent with the Supreme Court's refusal to find state action with
respect to the heavily regulated private social club in Moose Lodge 73 and
the private utility company in Jackson.
74
It is further submitted that the majority was justified in finding state
action under the "close nexus" test 75 because the state racing officials par-
ticipated in and supported Mountain Laurel's decision to terminate
Fitzgerald's stall agreement "by telling Mountain Laurel that Fitzgerald was
violating Commission Rules and by approving the ensuing expulsion." 
76
When state-sanctioned activity so heavily influences private action, it is not
unreasonable to require due process of law before any action is taken ad-
versely affecting another's rights.
77
In basing its decision simply on a vague reference to the state's "putting
its weight" behind the challenged conduct, 78 however, it is suggested that
the Third Circuit has failed to provide the lower courts with adequate guid-
ance as to when the close nexus test is satisfied. The need for a demonstra-
ble standard is evident considering the potential for too broad an application
of the state action concept which would result in unnecessary restriction of
private management's ability to discharge, suspend, or evict an undesirable
individual by subjecting primarily private decisionmaking to the require-
ments of procedural due process. 79 From the business viewpoint, such pro-
cedural requirements are not only time consuming and expensive, but they
may also impose an unreasonable standard of proof on the private enter-
prise.8 0 So, too, the consequent reluctance on the part of private decision-
makers to seek presumably complete and accurate official information will
foreseeably promote less well-substantiated decisions. 8 1
70. 607 F.2d at 592.
71. Id. See note 14 supra.
72. 607 F.2d at 596. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
73. See notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra.
74. See notes 42-47 and accompanying text supra.
75. For a summary of the court's reasoning on the state action question, see notes 55-62 and
accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the close nexus test, see notes 42-47 and accom-
panying text supra. See also Note, supra note 26, at 657.
76. 607 F.2d at 599.
77. For a criticism of the manner in which the Third Circuit articulated its rationale, how-
ever, see notes 78-81 and accompanying text infra.
78. See 607 F.2d at 598-99. See notes 55-58 & 61-62 and accompanying text supra.
79. See Note, The State Action Conundrum Reexamined: A New Approach and its Applica-
tion to the Constitutionality of Creditor Self-Help Remedies, 62 MARQ. L. Rav. 414, 427 (1979).
80. See 607 F.2d at 608 n.12 (Adams, J., dissenting).
81. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra.
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While the Third Circuit may have been correct in finding state action
under the Jackson close nexus test, s 2 it is submitted that the court did not
adequately articulate the type or the extent of state participation in. private
decisionmaking which will give rise to a finding of state action.8 3 As a re-
sult, it would appear that the Third Circuit has bypassed an opportunity to
provide workable guidelines for lower courts faced with this issue and has
failed to meaningfully instruct state-regulated businesses as to when it is




82. See notes 75-77 and accompanying text supra.
83. See notes 78-79 and accompanying text supra.
84. See notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra.
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